North-South summit

With the North-South summit making headlines all over the world, (yes, even in the U.S.), I thought I’d take a moment to discuss the South Korea approach to the situation.

For Kim Jong-Il, it’s pretty easy: he wants as much leverage as he can get in the final phases of the six-party nuclear talks. He also wants to improve his country’s economic situation (at the South expense, naturally) without having to loosen his grip on power.

For the South, things get a little more complicated if only because it’s a democracy, and there are different approaches. Option A is the “hard landing.” Option B is the “soft landing.”

The conservative right Grand National Party (하나라당) wants the North to suffer a “hard landing.” That a 1989, Soviet-style economic crash, where the South can take control of the North politically and economically on their own terms.

The liberal parties (including current president Roh Moo-Hyeon) prefer a “soft landing,” which is more difficult to conceptualize if only because it hasn’t really been done before. It’s predicated on the assumption that – sooner or later – the North Korean regime is going to collapse.

By looking at the German experience, a hard landing will mean hardship for many in the South. They’d rather avoid that, while accepting that it means a longer road to reunification.

For the North, the timing of the summit is good because the GNP is poised to win the December election, and their conservative stance reduces the chances of an economic aid package. I also works well for Roh Moo-Hyeon, who is looking at his last chance for a positive legacy.

With so little hard data coming out of the reclusive North, it’s hard to know just how close to the brink they really are. Roh Moo-Hyeon believes it would do no one any good to push them over. Yet by his economic aid he may be propping up a dictatorship that otherwise would have collapsed.

Until history can decide which way is best, I’m content to go the slow route.