And while -- yes -- the idea would be to "decapitate" the North Korean leadership in this event (a la Saddam Hussein), I don't think the plan had a lot of big secrets. The broad consensus has long been that a North Korean invasion would be futile, but they could sure mess things up along the way. Losing control of O-Plan 5015 doesn't change that.
As strange as it may sound, in a North Korean invasion the war would be the easy part. The hard part, according to an unclassified draft document by the Arroyo Center, is what South Korea and its allies would have to deal with besides the fighting.
For one, we'd have to deal with North Korea's nuclear capabilities. How would we keep North Korea from using its nuclear weapons against civilian targets? And how do we secure them so they aren't smuggled out of the country?
Two, how do we mitigate the MASSIVE humanitarian crisis that would follow a conventional artillery assault on Seoul? And how would we control traffic on the roads leading south?
Three, how do we evacuate all of South Korea's international community? This is a key strategic question, and the answer will impact how the world perceives our role in the war. Korea hosts roughly one million Chinese residents and students, along with another 550,000 from other countries (including 150,000 U.S.).
Just to get the Americans out would take about 1,000 C-17 sorties. But we wouldn't have all of South Korea's infrastructure to ourselves -- we'd have to share it with all the other countries trying to get their people out. And if we want China on our side (preventing what's called a "Theater Power Intervention"), we'd have to cooperate on this.
By comparison, in April 1975 Saigon had less than 7,000 foreign nationals.
Lastly, there's be the problem of dealing with a "catastrophic victory." Regime collapse in North Korea means South Korea would have to deal with reunification in a long-feared "hard landing" scenario. This means gaining 23 million or so (50% of its current population) impoverished North Korean citizens who would have to be educated and rehabilitated to work in the 21st century.
These are no small tasks, and there are no easy, obvious answers. Nor do they seem to be forthcoming anytime soon.
For all the bluster that North Korea puts out about the Allies' annual exercises (Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian), they remain *command post* exercises. There's a lot of "hand-waving" that goes on during these events -- lots of glossing over complicated, inter-agency problems so our respective militaries can focus on the purely military aspects.
So while the breach of security is indeed embarrassing and inconvenient, the theft of O-Plan 2015 affects little when compared to the monumental challenges that lie tangent to military action.
Tuesday, October 10, 2017
South Korea's stolen battle plans
South Korean lawmaker Rhee Cheol-hee reported on Tuesday that North Korea's cyber army had hacked into the Defense Integrated Data Center in September 2016. Among the 235 gigabytes of data that were stolen were Operation Plans 5015, South Korea's "master plan" in the event North Korea invades. [Source]
And while -- yes -- the idea would be to "decapitate" the North Korean leadership in this event (a la Saddam Hussein), I don't think the plan had a lot of big secrets. The broad consensus has long been that a North Korean invasion would be futile, but they could sure mess things up along the way. Losing control of O-Plan 5015 doesn't change that.
As strange as it may sound, in a North Korean invasion the war would be the easy part. The hard part, according to an unclassified draft document by the Arroyo Center, is what South Korea and its allies would have to deal with besides the fighting.
For one, we'd have to deal with North Korea's nuclear capabilities. How would we keep North Korea from using its nuclear weapons against civilian targets? And how do we secure them so they aren't smuggled out of the country?
Two, how do we mitigate the MASSIVE humanitarian crisis that would follow a conventional artillery assault on Seoul? And how would we control traffic on the roads leading south?
Three, how do we evacuate all of South Korea's international community? This is a key strategic question, and the answer will impact how the world perceives our role in the war. Korea hosts roughly one million Chinese residents and students, along with another 550,000 from other countries (including 150,000 U.S.).
Just to get the Americans out would take about 1,000 C-17 sorties. But we wouldn't have all of South Korea's infrastructure to ourselves -- we'd have to share it with all the other countries trying to get their people out. And if we want China on our side (preventing what's called a "Theater Power Intervention"), we'd have to cooperate on this.
By comparison, in April 1975 Saigon had less than 7,000 foreign nationals.
Lastly, there's be the problem of dealing with a "catastrophic victory." Regime collapse in North Korea means South Korea would have to deal with reunification in a long-feared "hard landing" scenario. This means gaining 23 million or so (50% of its current population) impoverished North Korean citizens who would have to be educated and rehabilitated to work in the 21st century.
These are no small tasks, and there are no easy, obvious answers. Nor do they seem to be forthcoming anytime soon.
For all the bluster that North Korea puts out about the Allies' annual exercises (Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian), they remain *command post* exercises. There's a lot of "hand-waving" that goes on during these events -- lots of glossing over complicated, inter-agency problems so our respective militaries can focus on the purely military aspects.
So while the breach of security is indeed embarrassing and inconvenient, the theft of O-Plan 2015 affects little when compared to the monumental challenges that lie tangent to military action.
And while -- yes -- the idea would be to "decapitate" the North Korean leadership in this event (a la Saddam Hussein), I don't think the plan had a lot of big secrets. The broad consensus has long been that a North Korean invasion would be futile, but they could sure mess things up along the way. Losing control of O-Plan 5015 doesn't change that.
As strange as it may sound, in a North Korean invasion the war would be the easy part. The hard part, according to an unclassified draft document by the Arroyo Center, is what South Korea and its allies would have to deal with besides the fighting.
For one, we'd have to deal with North Korea's nuclear capabilities. How would we keep North Korea from using its nuclear weapons against civilian targets? And how do we secure them so they aren't smuggled out of the country?
Two, how do we mitigate the MASSIVE humanitarian crisis that would follow a conventional artillery assault on Seoul? And how would we control traffic on the roads leading south?
Three, how do we evacuate all of South Korea's international community? This is a key strategic question, and the answer will impact how the world perceives our role in the war. Korea hosts roughly one million Chinese residents and students, along with another 550,000 from other countries (including 150,000 U.S.).
Just to get the Americans out would take about 1,000 C-17 sorties. But we wouldn't have all of South Korea's infrastructure to ourselves -- we'd have to share it with all the other countries trying to get their people out. And if we want China on our side (preventing what's called a "Theater Power Intervention"), we'd have to cooperate on this.
By comparison, in April 1975 Saigon had less than 7,000 foreign nationals.
Lastly, there's be the problem of dealing with a "catastrophic victory." Regime collapse in North Korea means South Korea would have to deal with reunification in a long-feared "hard landing" scenario. This means gaining 23 million or so (50% of its current population) impoverished North Korean citizens who would have to be educated and rehabilitated to work in the 21st century.
These are no small tasks, and there are no easy, obvious answers. Nor do they seem to be forthcoming anytime soon.
For all the bluster that North Korea puts out about the Allies' annual exercises (Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian), they remain *command post* exercises. There's a lot of "hand-waving" that goes on during these events -- lots of glossing over complicated, inter-agency problems so our respective militaries can focus on the purely military aspects.
So while the breach of security is indeed embarrassing and inconvenient, the theft of O-Plan 2015 affects little when compared to the monumental challenges that lie tangent to military action.
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