China and "Empire"

I've always wondered why "Outer Mongolia" was called that. It's its own country -- how can it be "outer"? And how can the Chinese province "Inner Mongolia" be called "inner" if it's outside Mongolia proper?

The answer is: Because of China. The two parts of Mongolia were taken by the Qing (Manchu) dynasty in the 1600s, and were controlled by China until Stalin helped them split off in 1921.

As New Chinese Empire explains, China's peripheral provinces (Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Taiwan, East Turkestan, and Manchuria) have periodically had independence from China's rule. East Turkestan has only been Chinese since 1758 -- which is why it's known in Chinese as 新疆 (Xinjiang), meaning "new border."

Compare the map above to this linguistic map. Pretty similar, huh?

China's big problem for the 21st century is that, like the Soviet Union, it has a number of minorities within its boundaries; many of them are concentrated in the border areas mentioned above. The CCP has seen what's been happening in Chechnya, one of Russia's borderlands, and is worried about the issues of unity, stability, and security. If Taiwan were to split off into its own country because it democraticly chooses to, what would that mean for the rest of China's borderlands? Could they choose to leave?

The "democratically chooses to" part brings up another issue. Taiwan is a democracy now. The PRC is most definitely not. If the people of Taiwan chose to leave, how could the CCP maintain its legitimacy in border provinces that have never had any freely elected representation in Beijing?

Since Communism fell in Europe, Marxism has failed as a multinational-binding ideology. Without Marxism, and the global revolution it called for, what basis for universal control does Beijing have? With neither democracy nor Marxism to justify its rule, Beijing has had to turn to something else to tie its various provinces together -- nationalism. The current rationale, in essence, is "We're all together because we're all Chinese!" The lines between nationality and ethnicity are purposefully blurred.

To the minorities in China, the "blur" is a clear and blatent lie, but because China is still ruled by the communist party, there's no room for debate. Beijing lies to its people in its textbooks, telling them that China has been pretty much the same as it is now for the past 2000 years.

One thing, though -- just as the borders of China have ebbed and flowed over time, leaving current provinces "out," so there have been other parts that at times have been "in." How does China feel about them?

Troublingly, China's imperial nature leaves nothing out of the question. If China's means allow, the currently disputed Senkaku and Spratley island groups will almost certainly be goals for acquisition. China may try to go after its "lost" areas, such as Vietnam, Mongolia, Parhae old territory, and maybe even Korea.

This past winter, while I was in Korea, I remember reading about China making ridiculous claims on the old Korean kingdom of Goguryeo, claiming it as "their" history. Link To be sure, part of Goguryeo lay in what is now China, but objective evidence shows it was hardly "Chinese."

For the CCP, though, objective history is meaningless. No foreign archaeologists are permitted to inspect its politically-sensitive treasures. Why? Because within the bounds of China, where the state still controls the media and there's no rule of law, there's no one to say otherwise.

Despite its recent economic growth and political reforms, I would say the future of China hinges on one important factor: political liberalization beyond just what the Communist party is comfortable with. Without it, China will contiue to be an anachronistic empire -- a misfit in the 21st century.