As stated in the introduction, author Thomas Ricks was on vacation in Sicily when he learned about Major General Terry Allen, who was relieved after the successful campaign there in 1943. Astonished, Ricks began to wonder: if this guy could get relieved after winning, why weren't we relieving generals after losing in Iraq and Afghanistan?
What follows is a history of U.S. Army generalship since World War II, with comparisons to the benchmark set by Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshal. Rather than romantic, eccentric rock stars (like MacArthur), Marshall's liked the physically fit, aggressive, and above all, team players.
Ricks includes evaluations of the failures in Korea and Vietnam, the Army's rejuvenation in the 1980s, and critiques of the strategically incomplete victories in Iraq.
At the end, he asks what Marshall would change if he were in charge today. First, he says, Marshall "would instruct his senior generals in how to interact with civilian leadership." Unlike Douglass MacArthur, Marshall always subjugated his military role to the civilian authority, and he was always candid when he disagreed.
Barring that, we need civilians who will relieve generals if they do not succeed in their roles. Without such intervention, the military system tends to reward inaction -- maintaining the status quo.
Second, Marshall would prioritize adaptive, flexible leadership over tactical excellence. In contrast to Tommie Franks, who won battles in Iraq and Afghanistan but failed to appreciate the strategic quagmire into which he sank his forces, Marshall would champion those who could bridge the gap between civilian policy and battlefield application. He would not have relied on mavericks like Petraeus to rebuff the military "establishment" for the right approach.
Marshall would also institute a policy of quick relief for below-average performance, instituting a cultural shift that embraces accountability. At the same time, relief from a position for non-performance would not be fatal to one's career -- a policy of a six-month probationary period might become standard.
In addition, Marshall would use technology to update personnel assignment processes. The Army would make 360 degree reviews mandatory to eliminate toxic leadership, and leave deployed headquarters units in-country longer than subordinate units. Education would be more vigorous, and command positions would be both more demanding and more optional.
Finally, Marshall would abide by the belief that "the lives of soldiers are more important than the careers of officers -- and that winning is more important than both." Fairness across the officer corps is nice, but fairness to soldiers and the taxpayers is more important -- officers who perform well should stay in their positions; those who fail move on and try again.
To me, these ideas sound good, but I wonder how much of Marshall's approach back then was because the Army was draft-based and expanding. In 1939, the Army was only 193,000 strong. By 1944, it was 8 million. In that environment, it was easier to give people second chances.
It was also easier to shuffle people out because they had no expectation of retirement. As it stands now, being relieved means your career is over. That's one thing when you're a general; it's quite another if you're a lieutenant colonel and still have a few years before retirement. Given that there's a higher proportion of families in the military, many have a powerful incentive to avoid professional risk.
As it stands now, only the top 5 percent of a year group can hope for promotion one year earlier than the rest. To avoid situations like Afghanistan, where "success equaled nothing that made them stand out for a year," you need to provide better opportunities for more top performers.
But then, how do you gauge performance? Evaluations can be so subjective. Should success be measured against objective standards, ignoring the relative difficulty of one's position, or by one's chain of command, exposing subordinates to a superior's capriciousness? And if you factor in position difficulty, how can you truly and equitably measure an individual's potential?
These kinds of questions may be pertinent in a wartime scenario, but as we exit Afghanistan and become a peacetime, garrison Army they will become academic again. For now, I'm comfortable with the simple, conveyer belt approach to promotions -- it may not be the path to glory, but that's not why I joined the Army in the first place.
I just wish I knew what "good enough" looked like. It seems like I've been working my behind off with little to show for it.
Saturday, May 17, 2014
Review: The Generals
As stated in the introduction, author Thomas Ricks was on vacation in Sicily when he learned about Major General Terry Allen, who was relieved after the successful campaign there in 1943. Astonished, Ricks began to wonder: if this guy could get relieved after winning, why weren't we relieving generals after losing in Iraq and Afghanistan?
What follows is a history of U.S. Army generalship since World War II, with comparisons to the benchmark set by Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshal. Rather than romantic, eccentric rock stars (like MacArthur), Marshall's liked the physically fit, aggressive, and above all, team players.
Ricks includes evaluations of the failures in Korea and Vietnam, the Army's rejuvenation in the 1980s, and critiques of the strategically incomplete victories in Iraq.
At the end, he asks what Marshall would change if he were in charge today. First, he says, Marshall "would instruct his senior generals in how to interact with civilian leadership." Unlike Douglass MacArthur, Marshall always subjugated his military role to the civilian authority, and he was always candid when he disagreed.
Barring that, we need civilians who will relieve generals if they do not succeed in their roles. Without such intervention, the military system tends to reward inaction -- maintaining the status quo.
Second, Marshall would prioritize adaptive, flexible leadership over tactical excellence. In contrast to Tommie Franks, who won battles in Iraq and Afghanistan but failed to appreciate the strategic quagmire into which he sank his forces, Marshall would champion those who could bridge the gap between civilian policy and battlefield application. He would not have relied on mavericks like Petraeus to rebuff the military "establishment" for the right approach.
Marshall would also institute a policy of quick relief for below-average performance, instituting a cultural shift that embraces accountability. At the same time, relief from a position for non-performance would not be fatal to one's career -- a policy of a six-month probationary period might become standard.
In addition, Marshall would use technology to update personnel assignment processes. The Army would make 360 degree reviews mandatory to eliminate toxic leadership, and leave deployed headquarters units in-country longer than subordinate units. Education would be more vigorous, and command positions would be both more demanding and more optional.
Finally, Marshall would abide by the belief that "the lives of soldiers are more important than the careers of officers -- and that winning is more important than both." Fairness across the officer corps is nice, but fairness to soldiers and the taxpayers is more important -- officers who perform well should stay in their positions; those who fail move on and try again.
To me, these ideas sound good, but I wonder how much of Marshall's approach back then was because the Army was draft-based and expanding. In 1939, the Army was only 193,000 strong. By 1944, it was 8 million. In that environment, it was easier to give people second chances.
It was also easier to shuffle people out because they had no expectation of retirement. As it stands now, being relieved means your career is over. That's one thing when you're a general; it's quite another if you're a lieutenant colonel and still have a few years before retirement. Given that there's a higher proportion of families in the military, many have a powerful incentive to avoid professional risk.
As it stands now, only the top 5 percent of a year group can hope for promotion one year earlier than the rest. To avoid situations like Afghanistan, where "success equaled nothing that made them stand out for a year," you need to provide better opportunities for more top performers.
But then, how do you gauge performance? Evaluations can be so subjective. Should success be measured against objective standards, ignoring the relative difficulty of one's position, or by one's chain of command, exposing subordinates to a superior's capriciousness? And if you factor in position difficulty, how can you truly and equitably measure an individual's potential?
These kinds of questions may be pertinent in a wartime scenario, but as we exit Afghanistan and become a peacetime, garrison Army they will become academic again. For now, I'm comfortable with the simple, conveyer belt approach to promotions -- it may not be the path to glory, but that's not why I joined the Army in the first place.
I just wish I knew what "good enough" looked like. It seems like I've been working my behind off with little to show for it.
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