Review: China Goes Global - the Partial Power

David Shambaugh's 2013 book takes a comprehensive look at China's growing international influence, and concludes that while Chinese's impact on the world is significant, overall it remains little more than a regional power.

Shambaugh states that while China actively participates in the community of nations, its reluctance to become normatively integrated means that it will remain a peripheral power for the foreseeable future. China is extremely risk-averse, and speaks less on what it is for than what it is against. Moreover, its "what's in it for me" attitude in international dealings and complete lack of alliances renders it more of a global actor than a true power.

The author also explores the China's various internal viewpoints on its international identity, from the pro-Marxist nativists and realists on one extreme to the (far fewer) globalists on the other. Given the Communist Party's limitations on open discourse, overall perspectives remain conservative. He also looks at recent documentaries and books that have captured the public's attention, and shows how they both affect and reflect the public's views.

In the diplomatic sphere, China has shown that it is willing to use international forums to advance its interests, but is not interested in becoming too entangled in the liberal, Western-oriented system. This aloofness does not prevent China from working with other countries, but it shows China's unwillingness to assume the same kind of leadership one would expect of a growing power.

With regards to global governance, China's goals again conflict with Western nations. While the West wants China to "acknowledge the rationality and legitimacy of the current system" (quoting a deputy director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and act as a "responsible nation," China clearly shows discomfort with liberal norms.

This should not be surprising -- after all, why would China support the free world's values abroad but still repress them at home? Instead, in the words of Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong, "China seeks to develop differentiated -- rather than uniform -- norms of global governance." It would rather replace existing entities than reform them or adapt to them.

Economically, China has become the world's factory, and its impact on global trade patterns has been tremendous. In addition, its focus on moving up the value chain has been aided by its growing numbers of patents and university-educated engineers. Its banks and oil companies have also become some of the largest in the world.

Yet China's economic impact on the world has been limited by its domestic business practices. Companies' hierarchical business culture and ties to the Communist Party cast a pall on hiring practices and human resource management abroad. Mergers and acquisitions have not served Chinese companies well, either -- in 90 percent of the M&As from 2008-2010, acquired companies lost 40-50 percent of their value after the acquisition.

The problem seems to be cross-cultural understanding and inability to adapt to foreign business practices, such as conducting due diligence, operating transparently, empowering subordinates, and maximizing long term value. Essentially, Chinese companies have had to learn the same painful lesson as other multi-national enterprises: that China operates differently than the rest of the world.

In exporting its culture abroad, China is hindered by its mechanical, propagandist approach. Despite up to $10 billion in "overseas publicity work," China lacks the "cultural substance" that attracts others. Traditional Chinese values were essentially destroyed in the Cultural Revolution, its socio-political model lacks legitimacy, and its official stance on "differentiation" undercuts any appeal to universality. As the late Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew stated in 2011, "China's political system is not attractive and they have no attractiveness as a model. China has little soft power." By many accounts, the "Chinese Path" （中国道路) simply can't be exported.

Militarily, China is a power to reckon with in Asia. Despite China's reassurances that its military is purely defensive, one must consider what it defines as "defense." Taiwan, the Diaoyu islands (disputed with Japan), and the South China Sea islands all fall within China's self-defined territory, and it's on these peripheries that a small incident could develop into a larger "defensive" conflagration.

While its greatest goal is a "blue water" navy to secure sea lanes to important resources, China's global reach is limited by its lack of overseas bases, a weakness that is not likely to change anytime soon. Again, China's political model and lack of soft power seem to undercut its ambitions.

So while China's impact on the world can be felt in many areas, it remains far from challenging the United States as a second superpower. China clearly wants the respect it feels it is due, but its internal contradictions prevent it from taking the steps necessary to truly impact the world in a comprehensive way.

(As a critique of the book itself, one of the things I appreciate about Shambaugh's work is his use of Chinese vocabulary. Words and phrases such as 软实力 (ruǎnshílì, "soft power") and 和平演变 (hépíng yǎnbiàn, "peaceful evolution") are not your stock Chinese-English dictionary-type words, but they are key concepts in China's public discourse. His inclusion elevates the prose from a straightforward work of non-fiction to a useful primer on high-level vocabulary.)