Thomas wasn't just a great general, he was a great man. His negative view of slavery developed from a near miss during the Nat Turner insurrection, and he was always considerate of the powerless around him, no matter if they were slave, native, or pack animal. He proved his bravery and technical mastery in battles during the Mexican War, and exercised his intellect even while posted in remote locations like Yuma, Arizona.
He took great interest in his men, and wasn't wrapped up in formalities with his subordinates. He paid attention to details, and was always accesible, as seen in the way his men "were used to taking liberties" with him. Ever the modest gentleman, he preferred to wear his administrative rank rather than make himself appear more important with his brevet rank.
Yet he was finely attuned to matters of honor, one time recommending that Grant be given command of a corps rather than himself, and he never held a grudge. Among Union generals, he was the only one who never lost a battle or a movement, and he was the only Union commander to destroy two Confederate armies in the field.
Unfortunately, fate conspired against Thomas and prevented him from achieving greater things.
- As a Virginian who was loyal to the Union, he was a political orphan. While Lincoln supported his fellow Illinoisian, Grant, and Salmon P. Chase supported Sherman, he had no one to advocate for his promotion after his victories. Had he been an opportunist, he certainly could have been successful with his fellow Southerners, but he reasoned that only the People -- by a kind of referendum -- could dissolve the Government, rather than any State.
- He started the war as a Constitutional Unionist, not a Republican. This put him behind the curve for promotions, as Lincoln was obliged to consider politics in his appointments.
- He served under generals who were either incompetent or out of favor. First it was Sherman, who was paranoid, then Buell, whose mistakes in the Kentucky campaign cost him his command, and then Rosecrans. Their subordinates fell under the shadow of their failures, and when Halleck became Army Chief of Staff, the bias remained.
- The attention of the press -- based in Washington -- was understandably fixed on the Eastern Theater. The telegraph lines were more fixed, the battles were more relevant to their readership, and there was more drama (especially with McClellan around). Similar to the preference during World War II for Europe over the Pacific, Thomas was involved in the less important theater, and -- unlike Douglas MacArthur -- eschewed the grand theatrics.
- Grant and Sherman actively worked to reduce his influence. They slandered him to Secretary of War Stanton, calling him "slow," ("deliberate" was probably more appropriate, as opposed to Grant's wanton frontal attack slaughters) and undermined his accomplishments in their memoirs. As the position of General-in-Chief passed from them to Sheridan and then Schofield, their revisionism cemented their clique's place in history at Thomas's expense. (In fact, Schofield indirectly caused Thomas's death in 1870 [Source].)
These factors combined have led history to overlook Thomas's accomplishments during the war, even his greatest moment at the Battle of Nashville. If nothing else, Thomas' genius can be seen here, although his record is certainly helped by contrasting against Sherman's own horrible blunders.
The events leading to the Battle of Nashville start after Hood stalemated Sherman outside Atlanta. Rather than continue to face off against an essentially free-roaming army, Sherman took the best part of his army, wagon trains, and cavalry, and set out for Savannah. Thomas got all the leftovers Sherman didn't want to take with -- the infirm, the unmounted cavalry, and little logistical equipment.
Sherman assumed that Hood would try to chase him, but he was wrong. Instead, Hood turned north, threatening all that the Union had gained since the beginning of the war and even Ohio itself.
Thomas had to scramble to get all his soldiers up to Nashville, where he started on the city's defenses, logisical supply, and reinforcements. At that point, time was on his side, and all the more so after Hood's army traveled beyond its own supply limitations.
Though Grant was impatient, Thomas stood his ground. Though he was threatened with removal, he would not move until the time was right. Getting mounts for his cavalry units was paramount, since he was going to depend on them as a kind of high moblity infantry armed with repeating rifles.
Once everything was in place, Thomas struck the Confederate line south of the city. He used mixed race combat units (ironically, a decision something even Northerners Grant and Sherman woundn't make) on his left to tie up Hood's right, and sent his cavalry around Hood's left. By the end of the first day, he had forced Hood to shrink his lines and move out of his entrenchments.
On the second day, Thomas's cavalry helped envelope Hood's left. Attacked on three sides, the Confederate line broke like an eggshell, and their retreat spread down the line. It was a complete rout.
In the end, Thomas lost about 3,000 soldiers (compared to Grant's 50,000 in the first month of his advance on Richmond in the summer of 1864) to capture 13,000 rebels (about a third of Hood's total), and destroy Hood's army. Hood ended up retreating into Mississippi with what he had left and resigned his command.
This kind of battle of maneuver stood in stark contrast to Grant's unimaginative style of relentless frontal assaults. (It took Grant a year to get from DC to Richmond, and cost over 100,000 lives.) His success is also amazing considering the enormous risk of failure -- Hood would have had free reign over everything up to the Ohio River.
In the end, it is Thomas who deserves the credit for Sherman's "March to the Sea," an activity that brought Sherman all the fame without a single challenge. (It wasn't until he got to Savannah that he faced any enemy force, and even then he let its garrison of 15,000 escape.) Had Thomas failed, the nation would have wondered why Sherman had marched in the exact opposite direction from Hood's army, and he would have gone down in history as the worst general the U.S. had ever produced.
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