This October 2013 white paper, sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, offers ways we can improve the development of our flag officers (contrary to the title, it's not just generals).
The first recommendation is to separate "operational" and "enterprise" positions. It's one thing to lead an army corps, but quite another to direct a business enterprise.
Given the different kinds of strengths required, generals should be matched to positions in which they're likely to succeed, rather than fill slots out of convenience. (The Army's already started doing that with sergeants major.)
Such was the case with LTG Ricardo Sanchez in Iraq. As Thomas Ricks pointed out in his books Fiasco and The Generals, Sanchez was selected to succeed GEN Tommie Franks because he was available, despite being the Army's most junior three-star at the time.
Second, flag officers need to stay in assignments for three to five years, with the first year being probationary, in order to have a meaningful impact on their organizations.
Third, flag officers need to have real educational requirements, not just "opportunities for networking." As it is now, the last schooling any general gets with when they are colonels. After that, the are little more than "seminars," with no real academic accountability. In the case of a three- or four- star, that might mean ten years without any sort of strategic refocusing.
Such topics as history of civil-military relations, 21st century warfare, and case studies in strategy would constitute the core of such a requirement.
Lastly, the promotion and evaluation system needs to change for three- and four-stars. Currently, because such boards are entirely closed, we probably know more about the selection process for the pope than that for senior flag officers.
Three- and four-stars must also be evaluated at least yearly. As it is now, they is no evaluation requirement for those ranks, and therefore no requirement for feedback.
To summarize, flag officers need more education, clear expectations, and tailored assignments. If you've read The Generals, it's impossible not to notice Thomas Ricks' heavy influence in the authors' recommendations. It makes me wonder how likely any implementation of these recommendations would be.
Saturday, September 06, 2014
Review: Building Better Generals
This October 2013 white paper, sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, offers ways we can improve the development of our flag officers (contrary to the title, it's not just generals).
The first recommendation is to separate "operational" and "enterprise" positions. It's one thing to lead an army corps, but quite another to direct a business enterprise.
Given the different kinds of strengths required, generals should be matched to positions in which they're likely to succeed, rather than fill slots out of convenience. (The Army's already started doing that with sergeants major.)
Such was the case with LTG Ricardo Sanchez in Iraq. As Thomas Ricks pointed out in his books Fiasco and The Generals, Sanchez was selected to succeed GEN Tommie Franks because he was available, despite being the Army's most junior three-star at the time.
Second, flag officers need to stay in assignments for three to five years, with the first year being probationary, in order to have a meaningful impact on their organizations.
Third, flag officers need to have real educational requirements, not just "opportunities for networking." As it is now, the last schooling any general gets with when they are colonels. After that, the are little more than "seminars," with no real academic accountability. In the case of a three- or four- star, that might mean ten years without any sort of strategic refocusing.
Such topics as history of civil-military relations, 21st century warfare, and case studies in strategy would constitute the core of such a requirement.
Lastly, the promotion and evaluation system needs to change for three- and four-stars. Currently, because such boards are entirely closed, we probably know more about the selection process for the pope than that for senior flag officers.
Three- and four-stars must also be evaluated at least yearly. As it is now, they is no evaluation requirement for those ranks, and therefore no requirement for feedback.
To summarize, flag officers need more education, clear expectations, and tailored assignments. If you've read The Generals, it's impossible not to notice Thomas Ricks' heavy influence in the authors' recommendations. It makes me wonder how likely any implementation of these recommendations would be.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment