Review: Bleeding Talent

How is it, Tim Kane wonders, that the military can develop such talented leaders, yet have such trouble retaining them? Sadly, the military is bleeding talent, both externally (through attrition) and internally (through misallocation of human resources). What can be done about it?

1. A Cautionary Tale. Criticizing the military is hard to do. If you leave it, insiders call "sour grapes." If you've never been in the military, no one takes you seriously. And if you've succeeded in the system, there's no reason to doubt it works just fine. Plus, there's the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980, which means any change to the military's human resource practices would literally require an act of Congress. All this makes changing the military's personnel system very difficult.
   
   The Army has no statistics on what kinds of talent it loses nor why, but its West Point graduates have an alarmingly high rate of attrition after completing their five-year service obligation. Despite being the Army's "best and brightest," the system makes no allowance for individual skills, ("talent"), so the most talented people leave. To solve this problem, Kane recommends moving to a free market system.
   
   
2. The Paradox of Military Leadership. The Army used to be the job you took when you couldn't get any other job, but it's come a long way since its "Stripes" days. The Army benefits from a patriotic set of well-educated enlistees, and Army leaders benefit from early responsibility, leadership training, and a focus on values.
   
   The "paradox" refers to how bureaucratically the Army treats its human resources, yet how innovative they can be (as seen in the Iraq War).

   "Lieutenants and captains have conducted missions for which they were never trained, executed operations that have outpaced Army doctrine ... and received very little detailed guidance or supervision in the process." [Leonard Wong, "Developing Adaptive Leaders," 2004]

   Because of Army leaders' ability to innovate, the civilian workforce benefits from veterans moving to the private sector. However, leaving the military is a one-way door, so the reverse is not true. There are no lateral hires into the Army (apart from its "Call to Active Duty" program), which contributes to the already wide military-civilian cultural gap.
   
   
3. Entrepreneurs in Uniform. The idea of "entrepreneurial" leaders in the military can sound like a joke, but Kane lists examples of Army leaders winning wars through three types of innovation. George Washington showed how a colonial army could beat a European foe. Robert Lee shaped his battlefields so often he was known as the "King of Spades." Joshua Chamberlain developed tactical responses to emerging opportunities at Gettysburg.
   
   Billy Mitchell's "pernicious" ideas got him court-martialed for insubordination, while John Boyd's emphasis on fighters and the "OODA" loop helped overturn the Air Force's bomber-centric paradigm. James Gavin developed the U.S. Army's first manual on airborne warfare, and at 37 years-old became the youngest two-star general since the Civil War. After meeting George Patton, Dwight Eisenhower pushed tank warfare so hard the chief of infantry threatened him with court-martial in 1920.
   
   Through these examples, Kane shows that military leaders possess far more "entrepreneurial" spirit than they are given credit for.
   
   
4. Exodus. This entrepreneurial spirit is in high demand in the private sector, but counts for nothing while still in the military. From lieutenant to colonel, officers have a set glide-path of positions they must complete to stay viable for the next rank -- platoon leader, executive officer, battalion/brigade staff, company commander, more tactical unit staff, then battalion and brigade command. There's precious little time for any deviation. And since the Human Resources Command (HRC) is paid only to produce generalists with similar experiences, the only things that matter for assignment purposes are branch and rank.
   
   It simply doesn't matter if you are fluent in Chinese, have served with a Female Engagement Team with the Marines in Afghanistan , or came into the Army with an advanced degree -- officers exist as mere round pegs to be plugged into the military's numerous round holes. And if (like then-LTC Dick Hewitt) you dislike your job assignment, you choices are clear -- either take it or get out. There's no room for negotiation.
   
   To close the chapter, Kane discusses the survey he conducted of West Point graduates' perceptions of the Army's HR practices and provides some rebuttals to common criticisms.
   
   
5. It's not Business, it's Personnel. The foundations of the Army's HR system reach back to Elihu Root in the early 1900s. At the time, the only way to get promoted was for someone else to die, and the National Guard didn't exist in its current form. Root reformed the Army to reflect the latest industrial practices of the day by integrating the regular army, militias, and volunteers under a single authority. He also established a general staff, and changed the promotion system. These were important innovations that put the military at the forefront of efficient, modern industrial practices.
   
   These days, the military HR system is defined by several characteristics that seem completely foreign to the civilian workforce: no lateral accessions, a one-way exit door, year-based cohorts, up-or-out promotions, competitive categories (branches), standardized evaluations, and centrally-planned assignments. This is all highly regulated and very organized, but like all centrally planned economies, it is doomed to be inefficient because of the knowledge problem. There simply isn't a way for the planners to take into account all the relevant variables.
   
   For example, some people like Hawaii as a duty assignment because it has lots of beaches and warm weather. Others dislike it because it's expensive, the mission tempo is crazy, and they don't like being far from their family on the Mainland. Without knowing all of these things, assignment officers simply can't be sure of a good match unless they completely discount people's preferences and just go with "needs of the service." Given time constraints, they don't worry about the best allocation; they look only for a minimally acceptable one.
   
   To better allocate its human resources, Kane argues that the military needs to change to a free market system, which he calls the "Total Volunteer Army." Unlike the system we have now, which we call the "All Volunteer Army," the TVF would allow people to make their own decisions where they will go, what they will do, and how long they stay in a position. And if this sounds completely foreign, consider that the federal government does exactly this with its GS workforce.
   
   
6. Winning Battles, Losing Wars. Critics claim this system would put unqualified people in key positions, but Kane points out that military is already doing that anyway. From 1964 to 1968, General William Westmoreland failed to apply an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy for the Vietnam War. Beginning in 2003, LTG Ricardo Sanchez did the same. As LTC Paul Yingling explained,

   "To understand how the U.S. could face defeat at the hands of a weaker insurgency enemy for the second time in a generation, we must look at the structural influences that produce our general officer corps."

   Rather than a promotion board that selects officers for promotion, Kane envisions an authorization board, where officers are certified for positions of a higher rank, but not required to hold that position. In addition, officers could move freely between active and reserve duty, depending on their career interests.
   
   
7. Coercion. When Kane wrote his book, service members received a pension only after 20 years of service. Those who left before then, as about 80%+ do, got nothing. Kane recommended (and the Army has changed to) a 401k retirement system for new accessions beginning in 2018. This will save the Army money in the long run and allow everyone to at least have something when they leave.
   
   
8. War Machines. By centrally managing people and treating them no differently from spare parts, the military has had a difficult time adapting to emerging fields. In the Army, it was cyber warfare. In the Air Force, it was drone piloting. The DOPMA model tries to manage careers by defining every step, but a better alternative -- ironically -- is the chaos of a job market. It's counter-intuitive, but it would provide greater stability through less bureaucracy.
   
   
9. Measuring merit. The evaluation system often doesn't help in identifying talent. For example, in 2010, the Air Force had 12,771 master sergeant candidates with a perfect score of 135 out of 135 points, from which to select 1,269 people. To help select eliminate toxic leaders and identify the best talent, Kane recommends a mandatory 360 degree evaluation. At the time of publication, the Army had already adopted the DA Form 67-10, which has a forced distribution system.
   
   

To summarize, the military suffers from a legacy of outdated HR practices that are stipulated by law. Kane offers a vision of a better system with his “Total Volunteer Army,” but the military has been lionized to such an extent that there seems to be little perceived need to change the current system.

Plus, the Army is in a drawdown from its peak numbers in 2011. While it is still bleeding talent both externally and internally, we will have to wait for the next generation of talented captains to attrite before the political will can be mustered to change anything.

Overall, a one-of-a-kind book. And if you want a second opinion, here's another review.