Review: Imperial America & the Bush years (2)

In going through old things, I cam across this book. After almost 20 years, it's interesting to look back at the perspectives the author held, and compare that to what has been going on in the world since it was first published in 2004.

Back then, the author's complaint was that the focus on Iraq diverted attention from real problems that required a broad spectrum of responses, and instead focused on "regime change" for a country that posed much more minor threat. Given all the subsequent events that have occurred in Iraq, and the vast sums that the United States has spent for Iraq adventure, I think the author's underlying point stands. The Bush administration was fixated on a threat that it didn't -- in retrospect -- really have to worry about, and committed the U.S. to a costly, unnecessary war.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. enjoyed the sympathy of the whole world -- even Iran extended its condolences. But rather than unite the world in countering transnational terrorism, the President Bush forced countries to choose whether they were "with us or against us" when it came to rogue states like North Korea. And Iran -- who as a Shiite country regarded the Taliban as enemies, too -- got lumped in with Iraq (its 1980s nemesis) in what Bush called an "Axis of Evil."

With the Global War on Terrorism essentially over now and the West focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I find that Chapter 5 is the most interesting section of the book because of its discussion of Russia. I didn't realize this, but Putin "was the first world leader to call President Bush after the attacks." (p143). Interests didn't always align, but Bush considered Putin a power partner that the West could rely on to make sure deals would "stick."

By contrast, Bush viewed NATO as an irrelevant partner in countering "rogue states" like Iraq. France and Germany sided with Russia in rejecting the justification for Bush's war, and NATO seemed ill-suited to counter-terrorism anyway.

Putin found a champion in British prime minister Tony Blair. "Blair concluded that western and Russian strategic interests were becoming alike and that collective security agreements that lacked Russian participation no longer made sense. Indeed, Blair wanted to see Russia become a de facto member of NATO.” (p145)

Subsequently, “...the new NATO-Russia Council was launched officially in Rome on May 28, 2002. Putin may envisage its modest arrangements one day fulfilling a two-generation-long Russian dream of a pan-European security system, in which Russia would deploy the largest military force and be able to block any alliance military action of which it disapproved.” (p146)

From the viewpoint of 2022, this is astonishing. Also surprising -- given Putin's demand that NATO withdraw from eastern Europe -- is that Putin had no contemporary complaints about NATO expansion. When the Baltic states joined in 2004, he acknowledged that “each country has the right to choose the form of security it considers most effective.” [Source]

Rereading this book after 15 years puts into proper perspective the fears we held following the 9/11 attacks. While true we wasted gazillions of dollars and many opportunities to solve more pressing strategic issues, many of the concerns listed aren't really that big of a deal. Yes, North Korea is a problem, but there doesn't seem to be a fear that they'd sell a nuclear weapon to international terrorists. And yes, Iran is still funding Hezbollah in its anti-Israel terrorism, but this seems to be small potatoes now.

The truth is, the United States has moved on from Afghanistan and concerns about terrorism. It's a different world now, and it makes me wonder if anything I felt strongly about back then was really worth it in the first place.