The consequences of poor posture

It's been 100 days since Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine. For me, the biggest lessons relate to the consequences of poor posture.

By “posture,” I mean the decisions a country’s military makes that address a particular set of threats. For 50 years, the U.S. Army in Germany was postured to defend against a potential Soviet offensive through the Fulda Gap. It made decisions about force structure accordingly.

Let’s use another example. When I was in the Philippines in 2016, I was surprised by the fact that the Philippine Army does not have packaged food (MREs – Meals, Ready to Eat). The reason why is that everywhere the army goes, it either procures food locally, or relies on the cafeterias of its existing army bases.

As a consequence, the Philippines simply does not have the capability for offensive operations. That’s OK, though, because they don’t care about that anyway. It’s a posturing decision based on what they wanted to focus on, and what they weren’t going to worry about.

Although the United States has a massive military budget, we can't do everything, and we've seen the effects of our posturing decisions.

Before 9/11, we were not postured to address the rise in transnational terrorism. The way our federal agencies shared information was based on other priorities, and it left us vulnerable. Then, after we succeeded in invading Iraq, we had trouble with the ensuing insurgency. Why? Because we weren't postured for counter-insurgency. We are not, by nature, a colonial power.

Russia’s performance in the war thus far has shown that it was not properly postured for a large-scale invasion. This was evident in the way:

1. Russian troops were not aware what the mission was. [Source] By comparison, the George W. Bush administration signaled the invasion of Iraq in the 2002 State of the Union address -- a full year before the invasion began. Although the casus belli he used turned out to be false, everyone in Third Army at least knew what they were fighting for.
2. Russian soldiers had not been properly maintaining their vehicles.[Source]
3. The Russian Army did not have enough trucks to sustain their operations.[Source]

Although being in the Pacific area of operations puts us thousands of miles away from the conflict, and (thankfully) the United States is not the one at war this time, there are lessons for us in this. Are *we* properly postured for the threats that we face?

Consider the following:

• There are very few units that fall underneath the U.S. Army in Japan headquarters. This is no secret, either -- they've put it right on the website. There's an aviation battalion to shuttle VIPs, a band to do public relations, and that's about it. There are a bunch of tenant units, but they answer directly to other headquarters located outside Japan.
• The #1 biggest use of land on Camp Zama is the golf course. As part of its efforts to be a "good neighbor," the golf course is open to Japanese citizens who pay membership fees. That's great for public relations, but it means fewer buildings available to units that might be stationed here.
• There is no railhead at either Camp Zama or the nearby Sagami Depot. What this means is that -- should some sort of contingency happen -- there would be no easy way to get equipment on or off these installations. This is a legacy of Camp Zama's prior role as a military academy; it was never designed to be a logistics hub.

As a result of decades-old decisions, the U.S. Army in Japan is postured for certain threats, and not for others. Given the propensity to focus on problems for which it can provide the answer, the U.S. Army in northeast Asia had been very focused on North Korea. However, looking forward, it will be increasingly important to reorient toward a more flexible posture.

Failure to do so puts us at risk of embarrassing ourselves, just like Russia.